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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001071

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SUBJECT: UN DDR PROGRAM CITES POSSIBLE OBSTACLES

REFERENCE: (A) KHARTOUM 987
(B) KHARTOUM 927
(C) KHARTOUM 517
(D) KHARTOUM 506

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¶1. (SBU) Program Manager of the UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (IDDR) program Basil Massey told poloff on July 9 that signing of the June 25 UN-GOS IDDR agreement in Geneva (ref A) capped a six-month long effort to move the DDR program forward. Massey said that at the June 25 signing the GOS had urged IDDR to start both disarmament and demobilization efforts in August, but IDDR refused saying the UN needs both time and funding to establish the logistics-intensive \$430-million four-year program. In the South, Arop Moyak, the Chairman of the Southern Sudan Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC), reports that there is no agreement with the UN on the amount of funding required for the program, particularly for the Reintegration phase of DDR in Southern Sudan. Due to a severe lack of employment opportunities and an under-developed infrastructure in the South, the ability of the local economy to absorb demobilized soldiers is almost nil, and the SSDDRC refuse to demobilize men who have little prospect of earning a livelihood. The potential for unrest and social upheaval, they feel, is too great to risk.

¶2. (SBU) Massey said that with the Geneva UN-GOS IDDR agreement in hand, the UN will begin to establish three field offices in north and south Sudan and in Darfur, begin to hire and train staff and start an IDDR program public awareness campaign. He said that increasing public awareness, particularly with government officials and rebel groups, is critical to avoid false expectations of what an IDDR program can provide.

¶3. (SBU) Massey said AEC Chairman Derek Plumbly believed the signing of the UN-GOS IDDR Geneva agreement represented substantial progress on the CPA. He added that the UN Secretary General will also highlight this progress in his periodic report to the UN Security Council. Massey said that IDDR momentum will continue with a technical donor meeting in Khartoum in July, an Ambassadorial-level national DDR council meeting in mid-August, and a mid-August DDR roundtable conference in Juba where any donor or implementing partner can raise its concerns.

¶4. (SBU) Asked about potential obstacles to IDDR success, Massey said that financial problems will be the greatest obstacle that IDDR needs to be overcome. He said that no donors have come forward to pledge the \$385 million needed for the four-year IDDR program, and that at least \$195 million needs to be pledged before the demobilization phase can start. He added that IDDR needs the demobilization funding to be in place by October 2008 in order to start the program by April 2009. He said that the GONU has already told him that the GOS is ready to live up to its \$45 million contribution, but is skeptical that the IC will donate its \$385

million share.

15. (SBU) In contrast to this, SSDDRC Commissioner Moyak reports that DDR in the South alone will require in excess of \$500 million to accomplish, and that there will be no DDR in Southern Sudan at all until there are sufficient funds to establish what he views as a realistic Reintegration program. "The demobilization and disarmament is the easy part," he said. "The hard part is Reintegration, and no DD will start until we know we have sufficient R." He said Reintegration is far more difficult and expensive to accomplish in the South because the Southern economy offers few job opportunities. "Everything here is more expensive due to the lack of infrastructure." He estimates it will cost between \$3000 to \$5000 per individual to create a realistic Reintegration program, which is the cost of providing the social and economic infrastructure needed to properly support a demobilized soldier. Currently, only \$1750 per person is available. Demobilized soldiers, he said, need some kind of medical support, the promise of education for their children, and the realistic opportunity to find productive work.

16. (SBU) Moyak's concerns were two fold. First, without adequate Reintegration support, ex-soldiers will have little choice but to turn to crime or rebellion against the government. "What they know is the gun, and they will return to the gun if that is their only option to survive. This could dramatically destabilize the South." Second, "If war returns, no one will fight if they see that the veterans have been treated badly." The South, he said, simply will not implement a DDR program that risked these outcomes.

17. (SBU) Comment: The difference in perspective between Massey and Moyak on where DDR stands speaks volumes about how out of touch the UN DDR office in Khartoum is with Southern views on what is currently possible. Moyak's assertion that it will take between \$3,000 to \$5,000 per individual to establish a realistic

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reintegration program is, of course, astronomical. However, what the SSDDRC Chairman is really asking for is enough money to develop a comprehensive economic and social development plan for Southern Sudan, which is an unrealistic objective of a DDR operation, and is completely beyond what his Commission could realistically manage. That takes nothing away from his point, however, that the South is currently poorly positioned to demobilize troops who have little chance of finding work, and who will likely then become a major destabilizing force in the South. At least in the South, an effective DDR operation will need to find a way to plug into and coordinate with donor funded economic development schemes to make this process feasible, if and when southern leaders commit to a broad disarmament program (until now there have only been efforts at civilian disarmament). The reality of DDR programs, which both Massey and Moyak did not acknowledge, is that three years into the CPA neither the South nor the North have made a commitment to move beyond a war footing and want to remain prepared in case hostilities resume.

FERNANDEZ